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Morin: Civil Remedies

CIVIL REMEDIES FOR
THERAPIST-PATIENT SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION
Laurie A. Morini
"In every house where I come, I will enter only for the good of
my patients, keeping myself far from all intentional ill-doing
and all seduction, and especially from the pleasures of love with
women and men." HIPPOCRATES, Physician's Oath
I. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
Since ancient times, society has recognized that physicians,
to whom we entrust our physic'al and emotional health, must be
held to a high standard of conduct. Sexual relationships between
physicians and their patients have been considered forbidden
since at least the 5th century, B.C., when Hippocrates authored
the sacred oath by which all physicians are bound even to this
day.2
In more recent times, Sigmund Freud, the father of modern
psychiatry, taught his followers that once sexual contact between therapist and patient begins, the therapeutic relationship
is destroyed. Freud believed that no kind of erotic contact not even an "innocent" kiss - should be initiated in the therapeutic relationship. because it might confuse the patient and
1. M.P.A., Northeastern University, 1980; J.D., Northeastern University School of
Law, 1983; currently Executive Director, Tobacco Products Liability Project, Northeastern University School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts. Any expertise which I have acquired in this area, lowe to my former colleagues and clients at the Boston law firm of
Stahlin, Bergstresser and Cole. Thanks also to the many therapists who have generously
shared their expertise in this area with me, especially Gary R. Schoener, Licensed Psy
chologist and Executive Director of the Minneapolis Walk-In Counseling Center and Estelle Disch, a feminist therapist and Certified Clinical Sociologist who leads workshops
for survivors of therapist sexual abuse at Tapestry, Inc. in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
2. R. BULGER. IN SEARCH OF THE MODERN HIPPOCRATES 9-11 (1987).
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lead to the "danger" of further erotic intimacy.s Freud's concerns appear to have been validated by a recent study of the
characteristics of "erotic" practicioners, which concluded that a
physician's attitudes and practices regarding nonerotic behavior
with patients (e.g. hugging, kissing and affectionate touching)
may help to predict those who would also engage in erotic (e.g.
sexual) behavior.'
3. In a letter written by Freud to a colleague in 1931, he says:
... You have not made a secret of the fact that you kiss your
patients and let them kiss you; ...
Now I am assuredly not one of those who from prudishness or
from consideration of bourgeois convention would condemn
little erotic gratifications of this kind .... But that does not
alter the facts ... that with us a kiss signifies a certain erotic
intimacy. We have hither~ in our technique held to the conclusion that patients are to be refused erotic gratifications.
You know too that where more extensive gratifications are not
to be had milder caresses very easily take over their role, in
love affairs, on the stage, etc.
Now picture what will be the result of publishing your technique. There is no revolutionary who is not driven out of the
field by a still more radical one. A number of independent
thinkers in matters of technique will say to themselves: why
stop at a kiss? Certainly one gets further when one adopts
'pawing' as well, which after all doesn't make a baby. And
then bolder ones will come along who will go further to peeping and showing - and soon we shall have accepted in the
technique of analysis the whole repertoire of demiviergerie
and petting parties, resulting in an enormous increase of interest in psychoanalysis among both analysts and patients. The
new adherents, however, will easily claim too much of this interest for himself, the younger of our colleagues will find it
hard to stop at the point they originally intended, and God
the Father Ferenczi gazing at the lively scene he has created
will perhaps say to himself: may be after all I should have
halted in my technique of motherly affection before the kiss.
Sentences like 'about the dangers of neocatharsis' don't get
very far. One should obviously not let oneself get into the danger. I have purposely not mentioned the increase of calumnious resistances. against analysis the kiSsing technique would
bring, although it seems to me a wanton act to provoke them.
3 JONES, THE LIFE AND WORK OF SIGMUND FREUD 163 (1953),
cited in Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 895, 381 N.Y.S. 2d
587, 590 (Sup.Ct. 1976)(Markowitz, P.J., concurring).
See also, K. POPE &. J. BOUTOUTSOS, SEXUAL INTIMACY BETWEEN THERAPISTS AND PATIENTS 29-30, (Praeger Medical Series No.5, 1986)[hereinafter cited as POPE & BOUHOUTSOS).
4. Kardener, Fuller and Mensch, Characteristics of "Erotic" Practicioners, 133:11
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1324 (1976). The study concluded: "It would appear that the freer a
physician is with nonerotic contact, the more statistically likely he is to also engage in
erotic practices with his patient." Id. at 1325. Erotic practices are not limited to sexual
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Despite these admonitions, research conducted by a number
of researchers since the early 1970's has revealed that a substantial number of therapists have had erotic contact with their patients. 1I For example, in a recent nation-wide survey of psychiatrists, more than 6% of the respondents ~dmitted that they had
engaged in sexual contact with patients.s Another study found
that 10.9% of male and 1.9% of female psychologists have had
some kind of erotic contact with their patients.' Civil actions involving sexual intimacies account for about 45% of the total
paid out over the last ten years by the American Psychological
Association's professional liability coverage provider. 8
Because the reported instances of therapist-patient sexual
contact overwhelmingly involve male therapists with'female patients,9 one recent analysis compared the problem with other
intercourse; they may also include kissing, fondling, nude swimming and other sexual
activities. Plaut & Foster, Roles of the Health Professional in Cases Involving Sexual
Exploitation of Patients. SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF PATIENTS BY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
5, 7-10 (Praeger Medical Series No.4, 1986). Other kinds of boundary violations (e.g.
dating, taking vacations together, or otherwise getting too involved in a patient's personal life) may also constitute malpractice, Id., but are beyond the scope of this article.
5. See, e.g., Kardener, Fuller and Mensch, A Survey of Physicians' Attitudes and
Practices Regarding Erotic and Nonerotic Contact with Patients, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1077 (1973)[hereinafter cited as Kardener); Holroyd and Brodsky, Psychologists' Attitudes and Practices Regarding Erotic and Nonerotic Physical Contact with Patients,
32:10 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 843 (1977)[hereinafter cited as Holroyd); Bouhoutsos, Holroyd,
Lerman, Forer and Greenberg, Sexual Intimacy Between Psychotherapists and Patients, 14:2 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH AND' PRACTICE 185 (1983)[hereinafter cited as
Bouhoutsos); Gartrell, Herman, Olarte, Feldstein and Localio, Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual Contact: Results of a National Survey, I: Prevalence, 143:9 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1126
(1986)[hereinafter cited as Gartrell).
6. Gartrell, supra note 5 at 1128. "Sexual contact" in this study was defined as
"contact which was intended to arouse or satisfy sexual desire in the patient, therapist,
or both." [d. at 1127. 74"lo of the instances reported included genital contact; in the
remaining cases the sexual contact consisted of kissing, fondling, and/or undressing. [d.
at 1128.
.
7. Holroyd, supra note 5 at 846-847. The study also found that 5.5"lo of male and
0.6"lo of female licensed Ph.D. psychologists surveyed admitted to sexual intercourse
with patients. Id. Since all the cited figures are based entirely on therapist self-report,
they can safely be assumed to represellt minimal estimates of incidence. Gartrell, supra
note 5 at 1129; Schoener, Milgrom and Gonsiorek, Sexual Exploitation of Clients by
Therapists, WOMEN AND MENTAL HEALTH 64 (1984).
8. Ethics Committee of the American Psychological Association, Trends in Ethics
Cases, Common Pitfalls, and Published Resources, 43:7 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 564,
567 (July 1988)[hereinafter cited as Trends in Ethics Cases).
9. See, e.g., Gartrell, supra note 5 at 1126 (88"lo of the sexual contacts occurred
between male psychiatrists and female patients). See also the statistics cited at notes 68, supra. Based upon these statistics, this article will \lse male pronouns to refer to therapists and female pronouns to refer to patients. However, the author wishes to acknowl-
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kinds of harm done to women, such as marital abuse and sexual
harrassment in the workplace. Io The commentator argues that
sexual exploitation of women patients by their therapists occurs
because women in general are conditioned to accept subordinate
social roles. The psychiatric community as a whole values such
subordinate behavior in women, and thus has been slow to acknowledge the problem of sexual exploitation. l l
Irrespective of the gender issue, one of the most disturbing
revelations of these studies is the pattern of repeat offenses and
the attitudes underlying them.12 The overwhelming majority of
therapists believe that sexual contact between patient and therapist is always inappropriate during the course of treatment. IS
By' contrast, psychiatrists who acknowledge having had sexual
contact with one or more patients in a recent survey differed
markedly from their peers in their attitudes. H The offenders
were much more likely to allow for exceptions to the general
rule;III for example, they were more likely to believe that sexual
edge that sexual exploitation may be just as damaging where the genders of the parties
are reversed or when the therapist and patient share the same gender.
10. LeBoeuf, Psychiatric Malpractice: Exploitation of Women Patients, 11
HARVARD WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL 83, 85 (1988)[hereinafter cited as LeBoeuf].
11. [d. at 84-85. Much of the clinical literature supports this view, underlining the
culpability of society and of most psychotherapists for perpetuating a stereotype of femininity which often leads to abuse. See, e.g., Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 49-51;
Holroyd, supra note 5 at 843.
12. Holroyd, supra note 5 at 847, reported that 80% of the psychologists who admitted to sexual intercourse had done so with more than one client. Gartrell's study indicated that 33.3% of the offenders had been involved with more than one patient, with
one psychiatrist reporting involvement with as many as twelve patients. Gartrell, supra
note 5 at 1128.
13. Herman, Gartrell, Oiarte, Feldstein and Localio, Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual
Contacts: Results of a National Suruey, II: Psychiatrists' Attitudes, 144:1 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 164, 165 (1987)[hereinafter cited as Herman). 98% of the respondents believed that
sexual contact between patient and therapist is always inappropriate during therapy sessions or concurrent with treatment, and 97.4% believed that such contact is usually or
always harmful to the patient. "Although 'always harmful' was not offered as a forcedchoice option on this question, it was written in by 13% of the respondents. Many commented spontaneously that they considered such behavior equivalent to rape." [d. at
165.
14. [d. at 166-167.
15. [d. The most widely reported exception was for sexual relations after termination of therapy. 74% of the offenders believed that sexual relations could be appropriate
after termination; only 27.4% of the nonoffenders thought so. [d. at 166. The survey
indicated that there is a wide range of opinion and considerable confusion among therapists on the matter of sexual relationships after termination. [d. at 167-169. See also,
infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
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contact could be appropriate if the therapist "fell in love" with
the patient,16 and a considerable minority believed that sexual
relations could sometimes be appropriate as a form of therapy.17
Repeat offenders (who comprised approximately one-third of the
offenders who responded) were particularly likely to believe m
the therapeutic value of sexual relations with patients. 18
Just as troubling was the offenders' apparent lack of perception of the harm invariably caused by their conduct, and their
overwhelming lack of regret for the consequences to the patient.
Most offenders who responded to the survey believed that their
relationships with patients were at best "mutually satisfying,"
and at worst "innocuous."19 Only 9.5% recognized that their patients experienced the sexual relationship as harmful,20 and only
one offender who answered the survey expressed regret based on
an understanding of the meaning of the sexual contact to the
patient. 21 For the most part, the respondents who expressed regrets were concerned about the consequences of the relationship
to their own personal and career goals. 22
16. Herman, supra note 13. 21.4% of the offenders as opposed to 3.5% of the nonoffenders. [d. at 166.
17. [d. Nearly 10% of the offenders thought that sexual relations could sometimes
be appropriate as a therapeutic intervention during treatment sessions, whereas only 1%
of the nonoffenders thought so. Moreover, 19% of the offenders said that sexual contact
could sometimes to beneficial to patients, compared with 1% of the nonoffenders. [d. at
166.
18. [d. "The majority of the offenders who condoned sexual relations within the
treatment setting or concurrent with treatment - and who accepted such therapeutic indications as enhancing a patient's self-esteem, providing a corrective emotional experience, or changing a patient's sexual orientation - were also repeaters." [d. at 167.
19. [d. For example, a 55-year old man, in practice for 24 years, who had sexual
contact with three female patients, characterized his most recent relationship as "a loving relation to a healthy human being I'd come to know," and said that it "in no way had
the usual sordid tinge." Another male therapist who had sexual relations with two male
former patients wrote that he learned from the experience and no harm was done that he
could see, although former patients were now off his list of prospective sexual partners.
[d. at 167.
20. [d.

21. [d. This man, who had become involved with a patient during his psychiatry
clerkship as a medical student, saw the involvement as having "no therapeutic intent,
simply a loss of impulse control on my part, not in love but in lust." He later felt great
remorse at his patient's disappointment in him, but was too ashamed to seek consultation. [d. at 167.
22. [d. at 167. For example, a 30-year old man who became sexually involved with a
patient during residency wrote that he had been devastated by the experience, and
couldn't believe the risks he had taken with his marriage and his career. He was not so
certain about the effect of his sexual relationship on his patient, since "[hler life was
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This callous disregard flies in the face of what is known
about the devastating consequences to most patients who engage
in sexual relationships with their therapists.23 Depression and
low self-esteem, two of the most common problems which lead
women to seek therapy, are typically exacerbated by such a relationship.24 In addition, sexual involvement with a therapist adds
to the patient's confusion and can lead to marked ambivalence
and extreme mood swings as feelings come into conflict.211 These
symptoms can lead to suicidal feelings or behavior, increased
drug or alcohol use, and in extreme cases to hospitalization and/
or suicide. 26
When the relationship ends, patients generally suffer a confusIng range of emotions. Many feel guilty about the relationship
and blame themselves for what happened. 27 They may alternate
between grief at the loss and anger at the abuse of trust. 28 Some
patients are afraid to tell their families or friends, so they become increasingly depressed and isolated. 29 If they do tell, they
terribly chaotic to begin with, with multiple moves, suicide attempts, substance abuse,
etc." [d. at 167.
23. Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 57-68. "The usual clinical picture includes a
loss of trust, poor self-concept, problems with expression of anger, loss of confidence in
the patient's own judgment, feelings of guilt, ambivalence about the damaging relationship, and difficulty in establishing a relationship in any subsequent therapy." [d. at 64.
For two first-hand accounts of the devastating consequences which these relationships
have on their victims, see, E. Plaisil, THERAPIST (1985) and L. Freeman & J. Roy, BETRAYAL (1976)[hereinafter cited as J. Roy]("The true story of the first woman to successfully sue her psychiatrist for using sex in the guise of therapy.")
24. Schoener, supra note 7 at 65. The authors work at the Minneapolis Walk-In
Counseling Center (WICC), a pioneer in providing short-term counseling and advocacy
services to victims of sexual exploitation by therapists since 1974. [d. at 63.
25. [d.
26. Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 61. Many clinicians believe that the sequelae of therapist-patient sexual involvement form a distinct clinical syndrome with both
acute and chronic phases, identified by some clinicians as post-traumatic stress disorder .
. [d. at 63-64. One study showed that 90% of the patients had adverse effects. [d. at 61.
They were more despondent, less motivated, had impaired social adjustment, and were
significantly more emotionally disturbed. There was an increase in drug or alcohol use,
suicidal behavior and hospitalization, as well as a worsening of sexual, mental or intimate
relationships, mistrust of the opposite sex and sexual impairment. In addition, they
never received therapy for their original problems once the sexual relationship started.
[d. Many victims who are seriously traumatized spend a lifetime undoing the damage.
[d.

27. Schoener, supra note 7 at 64.
28. [d. at 64-65.
29. [d.
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may not be believed, or may be blamed for what happened. so
Whether they tell or not, the problems caused by the sexual relationship can have devastating consequences for their spouses
and children, the unseen secondary victims of the therapist's
abuse of trust. 31
Perhaps the most universal symptom of therapist-patient
sexual relationships is a massive loss of trust in the therapist, in
the profession, and often in the fairness of life itself.32 This loss
of trust makes it difficult for the patient to ever get help for the
problems which first brought her to therapy, or to resolve the
problems caused by her relationship with the therapist. 3s Even if
a patient knows she needs help, she may not know where to
turn, and may be afraid that her confidentiality .will not be
maintained. 34 These factors make it difficult, if not impossible,
for some patients to seek assistance in getting redress until
many years after the injury has occurred. 311
30. Id. at 66.
31. Schoener & Milgrom, A Walk-In Counseling Center Approach to Therapist
Sexual Misconduct, in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF PATIENTS BY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 152,
156-157 (Praeger Medical Series No.4, 1986). The authors report that sexual contact
with a therapist tends to accelerate marital break-ups in shaky marriages, and children
often suffer from the emotional unavailability of one or both parents. Employers may
also be affected by temporarily reduced work performance on the part of the victim or
her family members. Id. at 156-157.
32. See, e.g., Sonne, Meyer, Borys and Marshall, Clients' Reactions to Sexual Intimacy in Therapy, 55 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 183-186 (April 1985). In their experience
with a post-therapy support group at the UCLA Psychology Clinic, the authors report
that the effects of the therapists' betrayal seem to generalize into a more global lack of
trust. The victims seem to have lost their view of the world as a fair and just place in
which individuals and institutions could be counted on. "They expressed disgust with
psychotherapy licensing boards, training institutions, and the professions. Similarly,
most women felt ambivalent toward the legal system, pointing to the unfair treatment
received by rape and incest victims." Id. at 185. See also, Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra
note 2 at 65.
33. See, e.g., Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 63-65; Apfel and Simon, Sexualized Therapy: Causes and Consequences, in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF PATIENTS BY
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 143, 146-147 (Praeger Medical Series No.5, 1986).
34. See Schoener, supra note 7 at 66.
35. See Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 130. "Frequently patients are so damaged by their sexual involvement with the therapist that they are unable to face wha~
has occurred to them. They may have strong ambivalence about the therapist. This feeling of guilt or complicity keeps them from even considering filing a complaint or lawsuit.
Sometimes the therapist has told them that sexual contact is part of the therapy, or has
blamed them for his or her loss of interest, and they feel so responsible for the damage
they have suffered that they don't realize that the therapist has the responsibility. These
patients do not know nor can they allow themselves to consider the possibility that the
therapist's sexual conduct is malpractice." Id. at 130.
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Many therapists who specialize in this area believe that filing a complaint against the offending therapist can be an important, positive and healing experience for patients who have been
sexually involved with their therapists. 36 For those patients who
eventually seek redress against the therapist, there are a number
of avenues available. s7 However, civil litigation is the only remedy which can provide money damages to compensate the patient for her pain and suffering, and pay the costs of extensive
therapy which is often needed to undo the damage done by the
illicit relationship.
This article explores the clinical and legal issues raised in
civil actions brought by patients against their therapists for sex36. See, e.g., Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 110.
37. Many therapists belong to professional societies which have formal complaint
procedures. See note 47, infra. Although these organizations do not have authority to
revoke a therapist's license, they may expel or suspend him, notify other members of
what happened, or require the therapist to get supervision or training to retain his membership. These measures might limit the therapist's career opportunities and patient referrals, and prevent him from perpetuating the abuse. See, e.g., Pope & Bouhoutsos,
supra note 2 at 115-l16.
If the therapist is licensed, a complaint filed with the appropriate licensing agency
could result in suspension or revocation of the therapist's license. [All 50 states license
psychiatrists and psychologists, more than half license social workers, and some license
other professionals as well.] Although a suspension or revocation means that the therapist can no longer hold himself out as a member of his profession, in most states he could
continue to offer services as an unlicensed counselor. See, e.g., Pope & Bouhoutsos,
supra note 2 at 117-118. See also, FLA. STAT. ANN., §490.Q12, 490.014 (West 1988)("No
provision of this chapter [licensing psychologists] shall be construed to limit the practice
of medicine, osteopathy, nursing, clinical social work, marriage and family therapy,
mental health counseling, or other recognized businesses or to prevent qualified members
of other professions from doing work consistent with their training, so long as they do
not hold themselves out to the public as possessing a license .. ").
Minnesota has enacted a registration statute designed to deal with the problem of
unlicensed practicioners, which requires all "mental health service providers" (a broad
term which encompasses any type of assessment, treatment or counseling) to register
with a board which can take disciplinary action (including revocation of the right to
practice) if they engage in sexual contact with a patient or former patient or other specified forms of misconduct. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148B.40 et seq. (West 1989).
In addition, some states have enacted specific criminal statutes which make therapist patient sexual contact during the course of treatment a felony or misdemeanor. See,
e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. ]940.22 (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. §609.344-609.345 (West
1989); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. ]]750.90 (West 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. §490.01l1-490.012
(West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §18-3-405.5 (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §632-A:1 et seq.
(1986).
Finally, a victim of therapist sexual exploitation may file a common law action
against the offending therapist for malpractice, intentional tort, or breach of contract,
see discussion at Section IIA of text, and in some states may have a statutory civil cause
of action against the therapist, see note 48, infra.
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ual exploitation. 38 Section II provides an overview of the various
substantive theories of liability and defenses, as well as special
procedural difficulties and problems of proof in sexual abuse
cases. 39 It suggests that the "consent" defense is an inappropriate analytical framework in a malpractice action based upon
therapist sexual exploitation. The real dispute should center
around the parameters of a therapist's duty to his patient
outside of the formal therapeutic setting. Section III examines
the statute of limitations problem, and suggests a statutory approach to ensure a victim's remedy is preserved until she is both
intellectually and psychologically able to understand and seek
redress for the injuries inflicted by the offending therapist.

II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY, DEFENSES AND
PROBLEMS OF PROOF
A.

MISHANDLING

OF

THERAPEUTIC

RELATIONSHIP

AS

MALPRACTICE

In 1968, Ada Margaret Zipkin was awarded $17,000 for injuries resulting from her psychiatrist's mishandling of the therapeutic relationship!O Several years later, in a highly publicized
38. For purposes of this article, "therapist-patient sexual exploitation" includes any
erotic contact between a therapist and patient which results from the therapist's mishandling of the therapeutic process. "Therapist" includes psychiatrists, psychologists, marriage and family counselors, ministers, and other licensed and unlicensed professionals
who hold themselves out as competent to render advice and treatment for emotional
and/or psychological problems. Despite the confusion among clinicians, see note 15,
supra, this article assumes that the therapist's duty to the patient may continue beyond
the termination of formal therapy sessions, and that in some circumstances it may constitute malpractice for a therapist to engage in a sexual relationship with a former patient. See discussion at Section IIC of text and notes 69-73, infra.
39. This section does not attempt to duplicate the work of other commentators who
have reviewed the substantive law of sexual exploitation. See LeBoeuf, supra note 9.
Instead, using the seminal case of Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 587
(Sup. Ct. 1976), as the primary illustration, this section analyzes some of the conceptual
and practical problems encountered in pursuing a civil claim for damages based upon a
therapist's sexual exploitation of his patient.
40. Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W. 2d 753 (Mo. 1968). This case did not specifically
turn on allegations of sexual contact, although a sexual relationship was at least implied
by the testimony, which included allegations of nude swimming parties. Dr. Freeman's
misconduct consisted of misusing the therapeutic relationship to induce the plaintiff to
attend social events with him, leave her husband and move into a farm owned by him,
and steal property from her husband, among other things. Mrs. Zipkin testified that she
fell in love with Dr. Freeman, put her faith and trust in him, and did or said anything he
told her was good for her. Expert testimony was introduced that Dr. Freeman's "treatment" of the plaintiff was a distortion of the transference phenomenon which caused the
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case, Julie Roy became the first woman in the United States to
successfully sue her psychiatrist for engaging in sex with her as a
form of therapy.41 These ground-breaking cases established that
mishandling of the therapeutic relationship - especially by engaging in a sexual relationship with a patient -is a basis for a
claim of malpractice or gross negligence. Courts across the counplaintiff serious (and perhaps permanent) emotional harm. Id. at 759-760.
Prior to the Zipkin case, most of the handful of reported cases had been brought by
husbands who suffered damages as a result of their wives' sexual relationship with a
therapist. See, e.g., Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill. App. 3d 140, 474 N.E. 2d 13 (1985)(husband
sued social worker who had been the couple's marriage counselor and had engaged in
sexual relations with the wife); Anclote Manor Foundation v. Wilkinson, 263 So. 2d 256
(Fla. Ct. App. 1972)(husband recovered damages for hospital costs of his ex-wife where
hospital psychiatrist had told the patient he was going to divorce his wife and marry
her).
In many jurisdictions, these types of cases were prohibited by "heart-balm" statutes,
which barred civil liability for alienation of affections, seduction and criminal conversation. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich. App. 35, 162 N.W. 2d 313 (1968)(husband's
suit for breach of contract, malpractice, assault and battery and fraud against marital
counselor who engaged in sexual relations with his wife was in substance an action for
alienation of affections barred by statute). See also, A. Stone, Sexual Exploitation of
Patients in Psychotherapy, in LAW, PSYCHIATRY & MORALITY 191, 197 (1984). Although
some defendants have argued that the heart-balm statutes also bar any action by the
spouse who engaged in the sexual relationship, most courts have rejected that argument.
See, e.g., Cotton v. Kambly, 101 Mich. App. 537, 300 N.W. 2d 627 (1980); Roy v.
Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 897, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 592 (Sup.Ct. 1976)(Riccobano, J.,
dissenting).
41. Roy v. Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 587, 85 Misc. 2d 891 (Sup.Ct. 1976). [The facts in
this note and notes 50-52, infra, are drawn largely from the plaintiff's own account, see J.
Roy, supra note 23.) Julie Roy was thirty years old in 1969 when she entered therapy
with Dr. Renatus Hartogs, seeking help for a serious depression following her divorce.
Shortly after she began therapy, Dr. Hartogs began asking Ms. Roy to have sex with him,
telling her that it would cure her fear of men and alleged "homosexuality." (She had
engaged in a short-lived relationship with another woman following her divorce.) Slowly,
Dr. Hartogs drew Ms. Roy into a sexual relationship with him, encouraging her to continue by telling her that she was making progress in her therapy. In general, their sessions lasted only about ten minutes, including the sex. When Ms. Roy tried to talk to Dr.
Hartogs about her problems or the fact that she was still feeling depressed, he would tell
her it wasn't important. After about a year and a half, prompted by Ms. Roy's increasing
demands for more time with him, Dr. Hartogs abruptly terminated the relationship and
refused to see her for therapy any longer. J. Roy, supra note 23, ch. 3-4.
During the following year, Ms. Roy was so distraught that she quit her job, refused
to talk to anyone, and had to be hospitalized twice to prevent suicide. She only turned to
the legal system for help when she finally realized that there was no other way to avenge
herself for the harm that had been done to her by Dr. Hartogs. Despite the assistance of
extremely competent counsel who believed in her case and did their best to protect her,
Ms. Roy's experience with the legal system illustrates some of the problems commonly
faced by victims of sexual exploitation who decide to seek legal redress for their injuries;
i.e., lengthy delays, grueling discovery, "blaming the victim," and difficulties in collecting
any damages that are awarded. See, infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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try have uniformly accepted this analysis,'u often adopting the
clinical explanation that sexual relationships with clients constitute a mishandling of the "transference phenomenon".43 The
"transference" explanation is only one of many plausible theories for a claim of malpractice. In most jurisdictions, all that is
required to establish malpractice is expert testimony that the
therapist's conduct was a departure from standard and accepted
practice and that this conduct caused the patient harm.44 This
legal framework leaves room for plaintiffs' experts to offer alternative explanations for the malpractice; for example, abuse of
the power. imbalance which is inherent in the therapeutic rela42. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986); Vigilant Insurance Co. v. Employers Insurance Wausau, 626 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Aetna
Life & Casualty Co. v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Waters v. Bourhis, 40
Cal. 3d 424, 709 P.2d 469, 220 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1985); Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill. App. 3d 140,
474 N.E. 2d 13 (1985); L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 122 Wis. 2d 455, 362 N.W.2d 174
(Wis. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, 122 Wis. 2d 783, 367 N.W.2d 223 (1985); St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Mitchell, 164 Ga. App. 215, 296 S.E.2d 126 (1982); Cotton v. Kambly, 101 Mich. App. 537, 300 N.W. 2d 627 (1980); Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d
891, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 587 (Sup.Ct. 1976); Seymour v. Lofgreen, 209 Kan. 72, 495 P.2d 969
(1972); Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1968).
43. "Transference" is a psychological term used to describe a patient's projection of
her feelings regarding a significant other (typically a parent) onto the therapist. See, e.g.,
Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986).
Transference is the term used by psychiatrists and psychologists to denote a patient's emotional reaction to a therapist
and is 'generally applied to the projection of feelings, thoughts
and wishes onto the analyst, who has come to represent some
person from the patient's past... .' Transference is crucial to
the therapeutic process because the patient 'unconsciously attributes to the psychiatrist or analyst those feelings which he
may have repressed towards his own parents. . . . [I)t is
through the creation, experiencing and resolution of these feelings that [the patient) becomes well.' ... The proper therapeutic response is countertransference, a reaction which avoids
emotional involvement and assists the patient in overcoming
problems ...
When the therapist mishandles transference and becomes sexually involved with a patient, medical authorities are nearly
unanimous in considering such conduct to be malpractice. Id.
at 1364-1365.
Once they have concluded that there is malpractice, most courts have had little difficulty recognizing that "by introducing sexual activity into the relationship, the therapist
runs the risk of causing additional psychological damage to the patient." L.L. v. Medical
Protective Co., 122 Wisc. 2d ~55, 462, 362 N.W. 2d 174, 178 (1984).
44 .. See, e.g. Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 893, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 587, 588 (S.Ct.
1976)(allegations that harm was caused to plaintiff by defendant's failure to treat with
professionally acceptable procedures stated a viable cause of action for malpractice).
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tionship even if transference has not taken place. 4I!
Such expert testimony should not be difficult to obtain,
since the vast majority of respected mental health professionals
believe it is an abuse of trust for a therapist to have sexual relations with a patient. 46 In fact, in response to concerns raised by
recent studies of the prevalence of therapist-patient sexual contact, the ethics codes of the major mental health associations
have been revised to clearly prohibit therapist patient sexual
contact. 47 Some state legislatures, in recognition of the problem,
45. The duty not to abuse this power imbalance has been described by numerous
clinical commentators, who see it as the core of the therapeutic contract. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 13 at 168:
Patients enter therapy in need of help and care. By virtue of
this fact, they voluntarily submit themselves to an unequal relationship in which their therapists have superior knowledge
and power. Transference feelings related to the universal
childhood experience of dependence on a parent are inevitably
aroused. These feelings further exaggerate the power imbalance in the therapeutic relationship and render all patients
vulnerable to exploitation. The promise to abstain from abusing this position of power for personal gratification is central
to the therapeutic contract; violations of this promise destroy
the basic trust on which the therapeutic process is founded.
Id. at 168.
Because the power dynamic created in the therapist-patient relationship resembles the
parent-child relationship, many clinicians have compared the prohibition against sexual
contact with patients to the incest taboo. See, Id. at 168; Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note
2 at 23.
46. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 13 at 168. Although historically a minority of therapists have advocated sexual contact with patients as a therapeutic modality, Herman
notes that such beliefs have always been considered unorthodox and have generated
great controversy. Id. Many commentators openly scoff at the notion that sex with a
patient could ever be therapeutic.
The physician's protestation that by being his patient's lover
he is really proving he cares and is therefore offering a valuable gift is best viewed as an emotional Trojan horse that conceals not only his own needs but hostility and antipathy toward his patients as persons and their struggle for emotional
well-being. In responding to his patients' erotic fantasies, the
physician can only finally prove to be a horrendous disappointment when, by the dictates of his life circumstances, he
must ultimately reassert his own realities. Kardener, Sex and
the Physician-Patient ReLationship, 131:10 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY
1134, 1136 (October 1984).
See also LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 91-92; Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 27, 58-60.
47. See, Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 30-31, which quotes the following relevant sections of the ethics codes:
"The necessary intensity of the therapeutic relationship may tend to activate sexual
and other needs and fantasies on the part of both patient and therapist, while weakening
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have enacted statutes explicitly creating a civil cause of action
for therapist-patient sexual exploitation!S

B.

THRESHHOLD CONSIDERATIONS

Despite widespread recognition by the courts that a therapist's sexual contact with a patient may constitute malpractice,"9
the objectivity necessary for control. Sexual activity with a patient is unethical." (American Psychiatric Association 1985)
"Psychologists are continually cognizant of their own needs and of their potentially
influential position vis-a-vis persons such as clients, students and subordinates. They
avoid exploiting the trust and dependency of such persons .... Sexual intimacies with
clients are unethical." (American Psychological Association 1981)
"The social worker should under no circumstances engage in sexual activities with
clients." (National Association of Social Workers 1980)
"Sexual relationships between analyst and patient are antithetic to treatment and
unacceptable under any circumstance. Any sexual activity with a patient constitutes a
violation of this principle of ethics." (American Psychoanalytic Association 1983)
"A therapist will attempt to avoid relationships with clients which might impair professional judgment or increase the risks of exploiting clients. Examples of such relationships include: Treatment of family members, close friends, employees, or supervisees.
Sexual activity with clients is unethical." (American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy 1982)
48. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §148A.01-148A.06 (West 1989); WISC. STAT. ANN.
§895.70 (West 1989); CAL. CIV. CODE §43.93 (West 1989). The Minnesota statute creates a
cause of action not only against the offending therapist, MINN. STAT. ANN. §148A.02, but
also against the therapist's employer [or former employer) for failing to request [or disclose) information about known sexual contact by the therapist, or failure to take reasonable action against a psychotherapist known to have engaged in sexual contact with a
patient, MINN. STAT. ANN. §148.03.
49. See note 42, supra. Although most of the decided cases have adopted a malpractice analysis, there are several other viable causes of action available to plaintiffs, including various intentional tort theories (e.g. assault and battery, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and fraudulent concealment) as well as breach of contract claims. See
LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 108-110. In most circumstances, there is little to be gained
from alleging the intentional tort theories, since proof of "intent" or "recklessness"
places a much greater burden on plaintiffs than proof of malpractice.
For example, proof of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires, at a minimum, a showing of "recklessness", e.g. that the therapist acted "knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize ... that his conduct
creates an unreasonable risk of ... harm to another [and) that such risk is substantially
greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §500 (1964). Moreover, the plaintiff must establish that the therapist's
conduct was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 comments a and j (1964). The "outrageousness" of
the therapist's conduct may arguably arise from his abuse of his position of authority or
power over the plaintiff, but even this is more difficult to prove than simple negligence.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 comment e (1964).
In the most extreme and outrageous cases of abuse, proof of an intentional tort may
assist the plaintiff in paving the way for an award of punitive damages, which in most
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plaintiffs face a number of obstacles to a successful civil action.
First, it is common for the therapist to deny that the sexual conduct occurred, thus turning the case into a battle of credibility.~o
The therapist has the advantage in this battle, not only because
he is a trusted professional, but also because he can use his superior training to brand the patient "crazy" and claim that she
imagined or "made up" the sexual relationship.~l Because the
plaintiff has put her emotional and sexual health in issue, the
jurisdictions requires a finding of something akin to "recklessness". But see, Roy v.
Hartogs, 85 Misc.2d 891, 894, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 587, 589 (Sup.Ct. 1976), where the court
overturned the jury's award of punitive damages because the weight of the evidence did
not justify the jury's finding that the defendant's conduct was so wanton or reckless as to
permit an award for punitive damages.
50. See LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 97-100; Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 131.
The Roy case aptly illustrates this problem. During discovery, although Dr. Hartogs appeared for a deposition, he refused to answer any questions on the ground that he might
incriminate himself. Then, mid-way through the trial, his attorneys indicated that he
was planning to testify on his own behalf. During a hasty mid-trial deposition, Dr.
Hartogs claimed that he had been unable to have sexual intercourse since 1965 because
of a hydrocele (a gross enlargement of the testicle). J. Roy, supra note 23 at Chapters 89. The judge permitted plaintiff to get a mid-trial medical evaluation of the defendant's
condition by a prominent New York urologist, who testified that he had never heard of a
case of impotence caused by a hydrocele, and that the draining of a hydrocele was a ten
minute office procedure which any doctor could perform. However, defense attorneys
used Dr. Hartogs' testimony to great advantage at trial, questioning Ms. Roy about the
abnormality and implying that she had "made up" the sexual relationship to get even
with Dr. Hartogs for terminating her therapy. [d.
As Dr. Hartogs discovered, the "denial" defense can be a dangerous one for the therapist. Once he testifies that he has never engaged in sexual relations with a client, the
plaintiff may be permitted to introduce testimony from other patients who were also
sexually involved with the therapist. See, Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc.2d 891, 893, 381
N.Y.S. 2d 587, 588-589 (Sup.Ct. 1976)(After Dr. Hartogs testified that he was unable to
have sexual relations with Ms. Roy because of his hydrocele, plaintiff was permitted to
introduce witnesses who testified that he had engaged in sex with them during that same
period of time.) [d.
Other victims of the therapist's sexual abuse may also be permitted to testify to
establish other relevant facts, such as motive, opportunity, intent, etc. See Fed. R. Evid.
404(b). One plaintiffs' attorney goes so far as to place an advertisement in local papers
seeking former patients of the defendant to compare treatment experiences. D. Burnstein, Sexual Malpractice Litigation, in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF PATIENTS BY HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS 49, 57 (Praeger Medical Series No.4, 1986). At the very least, even if the
other victims never reach the witness stand, they provide the plaintiff's attorney with a
powerful negotiating tool in trying to reach settlement of the case before trial.
51. See LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 98. In the Roy trial, Dr. Hartogs testified that
Ms. Roy had told him she enjoyed telling lies about people and had desires for retaliation and revenge, that she was hostile and distrustful of him because he was a man, and
that he terminated her therapy because he felt he could not help her. According to Dr.
Hartogs, Ms. Roy was an incurable catatonic or paranoic schizophrenic who could not
distinguish between delusion and reality. See J. Roy, supra note 23 at 194-210. This
testimony was corroborated by the lone psychiatric expert caned by the defendant. [d. at
232-234.
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therapist is entitled to discovery on virtually every aspect of her
psychological history, as well as wide-ranging questions about
her past sexual behavior. 52
In addition to denying that the conduct occurred, the therapist may argue that the patient was already psychologically
damaged and thus was not harmed by her relationship with the
therapist. 53 For an expert who did not evaluate the patient's
condition before the illicit relationship, it can be difficult to assess how much of the plaintiff's emotional problems were caused
by the therapist's conduct, and how much pre-existed the therapeutic relationship. This can become the basis for reducing any
damages awarded to the plaintiff. 54 Likewise, if the therapist is
uninsured or the insurer denies coverage, the plaintiff may be
left without an adequate remedy.1I1I
52. See, e.g., Burnstein, supra note 50 at 56. Once again, the Roy case illustrates.
During the four years between the filing of her complaint and the trial, in between hospitalizations for a debilitating depression, Ms. Roy was subjected to three grueling days of
depositions, at which she was questioned not only about her sexual relationship with Dr.
Hartogs, but also about her, sex life outside of therapy and "lesbian" relationship, her
subsequent therapy and hospitalizations, and her use of the drugs which Dr. Hartogs had
prescribed for her. The same kinds of questions were repeated at trial. See J. Roy, supra
note 23 at 125-132.
The Minnesota statute, see note 48, provides a partial remedy to this problem, stating that evidence of the plaintiff's sexual history is not admissible in an action for sexual
exploitation except when the court determines in a pre-trial hearing that the history is
relevant and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§148A.05 (West 1989). Accord, CAL. CIV, CODE §43.93(d)(West 1989).
53. See, e.g., Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc.2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup.Ct. 1976);
Burnstein, supra note 50 at 56.
54. See, e.g., Roy v. Hartogs, '85 Misc. 2d 891, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 587 (Sup.Ct. 1976).
Despite Dr. Hartogs' denials, the, jury believed Ms. Roy's version of the story, and
awarded her $250,000 in compensatory and $100,000 in punitive damages. The trial
judge reduced the compensatory damages to $50,000, stating that based upon his observations of Ms. Roy during the trial, he did not believe that she had sustained any permanent emotional damage as a result of Dr. Hartogs' conduct. J. Roy, supra note 23 at 257262. Dr. Hartogs appealed the decision and filed for bankruptcy. On appeal, the New
York Supreme Court further reduced the compensatory damages to $25,000 and eliminated the punitive damages. 85 Misc.2d at 893-894, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 589. They found
that the compensatory award for aggravation of Ms. Roy's mental disorders was excessive because there was no evidence that Dr. Hartogs' conduct had caused a permanent
worsening of her condition or a permanent impairment of her inability to work. Id.
Moreover, they found that the weight of the evidence did not support a finding that Dr.
Hartogs' conduct was so wanton or reckless as to permit an award for punitive damages.
Id. However, in negotiations during the pendency of Dr. Hartogs' appeal, his insurance
company had agreed to pay the $50,000 compensatory damages. J. Roy, supra note 23 at
263. See, Hartogs u. Employers Mutual Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 89 Misc. 2d 468,
391 N.Y.S. 2d 962 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
55. In response to the burgeoning cases, the major malpractice insurers have at-
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As the Roy case illustrates, a civil action based upon therapist-patient sexual exploitation requires great fortitude on the
part of both the client and attorney. At the initial consultation,
it is incumbent upon the interviewing attorney to advise a prospective client about the nature of the process, and to encourage
an honest and thorough examination of the facts before any decision is made to proceed with litigation. In most cases, it is
helpful to get the client's permission to discuss the issues with
any present treating therapist, both to see whether that person
will support the litigation, and to get an honest assessment of
the client's ability to withstand the rigors of pretrial and trial
scrutiny. At a minimum, the attorney should gather all relevant
tempted to eliminate coverage for sexual misconduct from their policies. The American
Psychological Association insurance policy expressly excludes coverage for sexual activity. See Stone, supra note 40 at 202. Since May 1, 1985, the American Psychiatric Association Plan has excluded coverage for "undue behavior" although the policy will continue to provide legal defense for psychiatrists accused of such behavior. See Simon,
Sexual Misconduct of Therapists: A Cause for Civil and Criminal Action, TRIAL 46, 50
(1985).
Even prior to initiating these express exemptions, the insurers attempted to deny
coverage for sexual misconduct by arguing that intentional conduct such as sexual relations with patients fell outside the scope of "professional services rendered." See LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 106, n. 113. Although this does not prevent potential plaintiffs
from pursuing or even winning their claims, it may make for a hollow victory if the
insurer refuses to pay and the therapist is insolvent. [d. at 106, n. 115.
Courts which have considered this issue have come to inconsistent conclusions. See
LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 106-108. Most courts seem to agree that, in the absence of an
express exclusion, if the jury finds that the conduct was negligence or malpractice, the
conduct falls within the scope of professional services and should be covered. See, e.g.,
Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 756, 761-762 (Mo. 1968)(an insurance company
which insures psychiatrists "in the exercise of reasonable care in the operation of its
business" should know "that transference pertains to psychiatry and is important in
treatment." However, the court limited recovery to the $5,000 maximum for "anyone
claim or suit", rejecting the plaintiff's argument that she was entitled to recover on three
separate policies for three separate years.) See also, Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v. McCabe,
556 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1983)(where jury found that defendant was negligent
in his treatment, it fell within policy language covering professional conduct). The new
policies with express exclusions have yet to be tested in the reported decisions, but at
least one court has denied recovery under the new policies. See LeBoeuf, supra note 10
at 108, citing Sphere Insurance Company v. Rosen, Civ.A.No. 85-2654 (E.D. Pa. May 16,
1986).
Under the old policies, most courts require the insurer to defend, but some courts
have permitted insurers in a subsequent action to seek indemnification from the therapist on the ground that the conduct was intentional. See, e.g., Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v.
McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Hartogs v. Employers Mutual Liability
Co., 89 Misc. 2d 468, 391 N.Y.S. 2d 962 (Sup.Ct. 1977); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Mitchell, 164 Ga. App. 215, 296 S.E.2d 126 (1982). Moreover, some courts have ruled
that public policy precludes an insurer's liablity for punitive damages. Aetna Life and
Cas. Co. v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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mental health records and request an expert evaluation of the
former therapist's conduct, the client's injuries, and any other
factors which may affect the viability of the case. Only upon
completing this review can the attorney assist the client in making an informed decision whether or not to proceed.
C.

THE CONSENT DEFENSE

One potential defense to therapist exploitation cases merits
special consideration, because it has a certain common sense appeal which may appear legally justifiable without careful scrutiny. This is the "consent" defense, which has two important
variations. 56 At one end of the spectrum, the therapist may argue that the sex was an integral part of therapy, the patient was
informed about the risks and voluntarily agreed to the conduct
-the traditional "informed consent" defense in medical malpractice cases. 57 At the other extreme, the therapist might argue
the sex was independent of the therapeutic relationship, the patient freely consented to the sexual relationship, and it should
be treated like any other relationship between two consenting
56. See Stone, supra note 40 at 202-204. In the Roy case, the dissent, who did not
believe that the therapist's conduct was malpractice, also raised the possibility that the
plaintiff's consent to the relationship should bar her lawsuit:
In the case at bar, although the plaintiff was suffering from a
number of emotional problems her competency was never
placed in issue. Is it not fair to infer, therefore, that she was
capable of giving a knowing and meaningful consent? For almost one and a half years while this 'meaningful' relationship
continued, the plaintiff was not heard to complain. Upon the
defendant terminating the relationship, this lawsuit evolves.
Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc.2d 891, 897, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 591
(Sup.Ct. 1976)(Riccobono, J. dissenting).
Judge Riccobono went on to say that the action should be barred as one of seduction,
and that the civil courts were not the appropriate forum for addressing the therapist's
misconduct. [d., 85 Misc.2d at 897-898, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 591-592. The majority upheld
the malpractice claim without commenting on the consent issue. [d., 85 Misc.2d at 893,
381 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
See also, LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 102-106, which notes that some courts distinguish between sex in the guise of therapy and sex which the defendant admits was purely
for his own gratification. Courts which make this distinction usually hold that consent is
not an available defense when the sex is done as part of therapy, because the plaintiff
was consenting to treatment rather than sex. [d. at 102, citing Jacobsen v. Muller, 181
Ga. App. 382, 386 n. 2, 352 S.E. 2d 604, 608 n. 2 (1986)(Deen, P.J., concurring). However,
they leave open the possibililty that consent may be a defense to sex which is not a part
of the therapy. LaBoeuf, supra at 102-106.
57. See Stone, supra note 40 at 202-203.
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adults. 58
The courts have had little trouble finding liability in the
former situation, reasoning that the patient may have consented
to "therapy", but this consent does not carryover to conduct
which most experts agree is not proper therapy. 59 The latter situation is more problematic. Most courts which have considered
the issue have viewed it in terms of "capacity" to consent, reasoning that a patient who has gone to therapy for treatment of
emotional or psychological problems is not capable of fully
granting or withholding consent from her therapist. 60 This theory finds support in the clinical literature, which suggests that
the nature of the therapist patient relationship (in which the
therapist is always significantly more knowledgeable and powerful than the patient)61 makes it clinically impossible for a patient to give voluntary and informed consent to the sexual relationship.62 In clinical terms, it is the therapist's rather than the
patient's duty to avoid the sexual contact. 63
Although the theory that a patient lacks capacity to consent
to a sexual relationship with her therapist is compatible with
clinical explanations of the nature of the therapeutic relationship, some feminist commentators fear it advances the stereotypical view of women as powerless, dependent, and incapable
58.Id.
59. To obtain a valid "informed consent" from a patient for sex under the guise of
therapy, the therapist would have to disclose both the nature of the treatment and the
extent of the harm involved. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §892B comment i (1977).
It would be an unusual case indeed where a therapist informed a patient, prior to commencement of a sexual relationship, that this "tre'atment" might cause the devastating
consequences discussed in Section I of the text.
LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 102-106, argues that the "under guise of treatment" distinction is an arbitrary one which does not take into account the fact that there would be
no sexual relationship if there were no therapeutic relationship. Id. at 103. Obtaining
sexual acquiescence by presenting the sex as therapy is only one form of coercion practiced by exploitive therapists. Id. at 105-106. LeBoeuf argues that it serves no legally
justifiable purpose to permit recovery when the therapist represents the sex as part of
treatment, but to deny recovery under other circumstnces. Id.
60. See LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 100-102, and cases cited. See a/so, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §892A(2) comment b (1977). "If, however, the one who consents is
not capable of appreciating the nature, extent or probably consequences of the conduct,
the consent is not effective ... ". Id.
61. See, Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 23-24, 124.
62. See LeBoeuf, supra note 10 at 100-102. See also Pope, supra note 2 at 122, 132.
63. See Pope, supra note 2 at 124.
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of making their own decisions. 6 • Further, in some jurisdictions,
lack of capacity to consent is difficult to prove, requiring that
the plaintiff be unable to manage her affairs or comprehend .her
legal rights and liabilities. 611 If a plaintiff has been able to continue working and has not been otherwise incapacitated, the
court may be skeptical about an argument that she lacked capacity for the specific purpose of consenting to a sexual relationship with her therapist. 66
D.

A

QUESTION OF DUTY

In any event, if the cause of action against the therapist is
framed as malpractice rather than an intentional tort, the "consent" defense is inappropriate. 67 The underlying issue of real
concern in such cases is a "duty" question; i.e., does a therapist
have a duty to refrain from sexual relations with a patient - even
64. See LeBoeuf, supra note 9 at 101-102.
65. See, 51 AM.JUR.2D, Limitation of Actions §187 and cases cited. Compare, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ([892(A)(2)(a)comment b (not capable of appreciating the
nature, extent or probable consequences of the conduct). See,' e.g., Decker v. Fink, 47
Md. App. 202, 422 A. 2d 389, 392 (1980).
66. The other legal theories for countering a consent defense, i.e., fraud and duress,
have' similar limitations. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §892B (1977). If a plaintiff is induced by fraud, mistake or duress to consent to a harmful or offensive contact,
the consent is not effective. Thus, where the therapist represented to the patient that the
sexual contact would be beneficial, and the patient relied on that representation in consenting to the sexual relationship, the consent may be ineffective. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §892B comment h (1977). Likewise, if the plaintiff is compelled to consent by the exercise of the therapist's will, her consent will be ineffective. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §892B comment j (1977). However, the forms of duress which courts
have generally required to render consent ineffective "are quite drastic in their nature
and •.. clearly and immediately amount to an overpowering of the will," as in force or
threats of force. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §892B comment j (1977). Although a
clinical argument can be made that the nature of the therapeutic relationship renders
these defenses applicable, the usual sexual exploitation case does not fit the strict standards traditionally applied by courts in evaluating claims of fraud and duress.
67. See, Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 132. Under basic principles of black
letter law, consent is a defense only to intentional torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §49 (1964). The analogous principle in negligence actions is "assumption of the
risk." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §892A comment a (1977). Assumption of the risk
requires that the plaintiff must fully understand the particular risk of harm which may
be caused by the defendant's conduct, and must appreciate its unreasonable character.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §496C 496D (1964). These conditions clearly do not
apply in the usual sexual exploitation case, where the patient is unaware of the nature
and extent of the risk of injury. In fact, this standard is loosely comparable to the "informed consent" to treatment standard, which the courts have had no trouble rejecting
in these circumstances. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. .
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outside of the therapeutic setting or after the termination of the
formal therapist-patient relationship?
With regard to sexual relationships which take place during
the course of treatment (even if the actual sex takes place
outside of the therapy sessions), the clinical commentators are in
agreement that such sexual contact cannot be separated from
the therapeutic relationship and that any sexual contact therefore constitutes malpractice. 68 With regard to post-termination
sex, there is widespread disagreement among clinicians whether,
and under what circumstances, a sexual relationship may be
permissible. 69
Some therapists believe that such a relationship may be
permissible with the passage of time, especially if it is to pursue
a "serious, commited" relationship which leads to love and marriage. 70 Other commentators scoff at the idea of such distinctions, taking the position that the prohibition against sexual
contact is permanently established with the initial encounter
and cannot be abrogated by termination. 7 ! Numerous authors
68. In recognition of these clinical standards, the Minnesota and California statutes
specifically provide that it is not a defense to the action that sexual contact occurred
outside a therapy or treatment session or off the premises regularly used by the therapist
for therapy or treatment sessions. MINN. STAT. ANN. §148A.02(2)(West 1989); CAL. CIY.
CODE §43.93(cHWest 1989). See also, Simon, supra note 55 at 49 (citing two unreported
decisions which rejected the argument that therapy had been terminated before the sexual relationship began).
69. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 13 at 167; Schoener, Some Observations on Sexual Relationships Between Client and Therapist After Therapy Ends, Presented at the
Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C. (August 24, 1986)[hereinafter cited as Schoener). Schoener points out that the professional
codes of ethics are essentially silent on the question of post-therapy sex, and conceptual
articles and research are virtually non-existent. Id. at 2.
70. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 13 at 168 (discussing the views of Perr and
Marmor). The apparent rationale for their view is that therapists are only human, and
sometimes cannot master their own counter-transference feelings. Id. Perr and Marmor
would require the therapist who finds himself in this situation to terminate the professional relationship and refer the patient elsewhere for treatment. Id. See also, Trends in
Ethics Cases, supra note 8 at 567-569; Schoener, supra note 69 at 2.
71. See Herman, supra note 13 at 168 (discussing the views of Anderson and Brodsky); Trends in Ethics Cases, supra note 8 at 568. Herman adopts this view in unequivocal terms:
Neither transference nor the real inequality in the power relationship ends with the termination of therapy. In our opinion,
the notion that exceptions to the rule of abstinence can be allowed in the name of love or marriage reveals either a naive
romanticism or an insufficient understanding of the nature of
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compare the prohibition against sexual contact with patients to
the incest taboo. Just as sexual contact with a child "does not
become acceptable one year after the daughter has left home",
these commentators believe that sex with a former patient does
not become acceptable at some magic time after the formal therapeutic relationship has ended. 72
Because of the widespread disagreement among clinicians, it
is impossible to articulate a bright-line test for evaluating when
the therapist's duty to a former patient ends. As in any malpractice action, expert testimony will be required on the issue, and
the trial may turn into a "battle of the experts". The clinical
literature, however, does suggest some relevant considerations in
determining when a therapist's sexual conduct with a former patient breaches his professional duty. These ,considerations revolve around the nature of the particular therapeutic relationship, as well as the circumstances surrounding the termination
of therapy and the beginning of the sexual relationship.73
Minnesota, which enacted one of the first statutes creating a
civil cause of action for therapist-patient sexual exploitation, attempted to resolve this ambiguity by defining both a time limit
the therapeutic relationship or both. Similarly, pragmatic efforts to define a post-termintion waiting period, after which
sexual relations might be permissible, disregards both the continued inequality of the roles of the therapist and former patient and the timelessness of unconscious processes, including
transference. Herman, supra note 13 at 168.
72. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 13 at 1168: "This analogy accurately describes
both the psychodynamics and the reality of the power relationship." See also Kardener,
Sex and the Physician-Patient Relationship, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1134, 1135 (1974).
73. See Schoener, supra note 69 at 5-8. As Schoener points out, even the initial
determination of when the therapy actually ended is a difficult one. "Was a followup
phone call 6 months later a psychotherapeutic interaction? Was that brief, impromptu
followup consultation in private during a chance social meeting a continuation of the
psychotherapy relationship?" [d. at 5.
Schoener suggests that the following factors are relevant in evaluating whether posttermination sex is clinically appropriate: 1) Was there "therapeutic deception"; e.g. did
the therapist tell the patient that the sex was part of treatment or otherwise appropriate? (2) Was there a real termination: e.g. was the end of therapy discussed, was there a
break in emotional involvement, or was the termination for the purpose of allowing a
sexual or romantic involvement? (3) Did the therapist and patient obtain outside consultation (preferably as a couple) to determine whether the sexual relationship was an improper continuation of the therapeutic relationship? (4) Who initiated the sexual relationship? (5) What was the length and level of therapeutic involvement (and the
concomitant power inequity)? (6) What were the particular emotional vulnerabilities of
the client? [d. at 7-8.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989

21

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 1

422

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:401

and the circumstances which would make a psychotherapists's
sexual contact with a former patient actionable. 74 If the sexual
contact begins within two years after the termination of therapy,
the statute provides a cause of action if the former patient was
"emotionally dependent" on the therapist or the sexual contact
occurred by means of "therapeutic deception".711
Both of the operative conditions are defined in terms of the
therapist's knowledge and intentions. A former patient is considered to be "emotionally dependent" if the therapist knows or
has reason to believe (based upon the nature of the relationship)
that she is unable to withhold consent to sexual contact. 76 Likewise, "therapeutic deception" comes into play if the therapist
makes a representation that sexual contact is consistent with or
part of the former patient's treatment. 77 These considerations
may be appropriate, but they fail to take into account the patient's subjective perceptions and the more subtle kinds of pressure which may be brought to bear simply by the inequality of
the relationship. Moreover, they appear to minimize the therepist's duty to use his superior clinical knowledge to protect former patients from relationships which they may not be emotionally prepared to handle.
The Minnesota statute is a good starting point in providing
protection to victims of psychiatric sexual exploitation, but it
seems unfair to place the burden of proving the therapist's
knowledge and intentions on the plaintiff, who has no way of
proving them other than the therapist's own testimony. One alternative approach would be to adopt a subjective standard
based upon the patient's perceptions of the relationship. Under
this standard, the plaintiff could testify as to her own feelings of
dependency rather than trying to establish what the therapist
knew about her feelings of dependency. This testimony could be
buttressed by expert testimony of "emotional dependency"
based upon clinical observations of the plaintiff's condition.
74. MINN. STAT. ANN. §148A.02(1) and (2)(West 1989).
75. MINN. STAT. ANN. §148A.01(3)(West 1989) ("Former patient" means a person
who was given psychotherapy within two years prior to sexual contact with the psychotherapist); §148A.02(2) (a cause of action exists for "former patients" if they were "emotionally dependent" upon the psychotherapist or the sexual contact occurred by means
of "therapeutic deception").
76. MINN. STAT. ANN. §148A.01(2)(West 1989).
77. MINN. STAT. ANN., §148A.01 (8)(West 1989).
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It is possible to envision a standard where capacity to consent does not even come into play. If the patient testifies she
was emotionally dependent upon the therapist, and if expert testimony establishes the transference phenomenon or the power
imbalance was still operating, the burden would shift to the
therapist to establish he did not know (and did not have reason
to know) that his sexual conduct exploited the patient's trust.

III. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
As was discussed in Section I, supra, the psychological dynamics of the patient-therapist relationship often make it impossible for the patient to face the implications of her relationship with the therapist until many years after the conduct has
occurred. 78 It is not uncommon for a patient to delay several
years before she seeks legal redress for her injuries, thus giving
rise to a statute of limitations defense. 79
Historically, laws limiting actions are the creation of statutes; without these statutory restrictions, an injured person
would face no time restrictions in seeking redress for an injury.8o
Statutes of limitations are designed to protect potential defendants from perpetual liability, and to avoid the dangers of "stale"
claims where evidence has been lost and witnesses' memories
have faded. In interpreting the statutes, courts have to balance
these policies with the legitimate interests of injuried parties in
seeking redress for their grievances. 81 A number of equitable exceptions to the statute of limitations have beEm established by
the courts to protect the interests of potential plaintiffs who, for
good reason, have been inhibited from prompt legal action. 82 Although these exceptions may be sufficient to protect victims of
sexual exploitation in certain circumstances, they are subject to
78. See Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 130.
79.Id.
80. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions §135 (1970); Saiten, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
189, 206-208 (1984)[hereinafter cited as Saiten]. Although the time periods imposed by
statutes of limitations vary considerably from state to state, there are a number of principles of interpretation which have gained widespread acceptance across the jurisdictions. These principles will be discussed in general terms in this article; however, reference to the laws of a particular state are essential to analyze any particular case.
81. See Salten, supra note 80 at 206-208.
82. Id. at 207.
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vagaries of interpretation which may leave many victims without
a remedy.
A.

THE DISCOVERY RULE

In personal injury actions, the time period during which a
plaintiff is permitted access to the courts is generally measured
from the date when the cause of action "accrues" or "arises",.
Historically, this date has been measured from the time the negligent act occurs and some injury is sustained, regardless of
whether or not substantial damages have occurred. s3 To ease the
harshness of this rule, a growing number of jurisdictions have
adopted a "discovery" rule, which provides that the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until a prospective plaintiff
learns or reasonably should have learned the defendant's conduct has caused her harm. s •
Most courts which have adopted a discovery rule seem to
view it as a limited exception. S & In most jurisdictions it is not
sufficient for the plaintiff to claim she did not know the legal
basis for her claim, or that she was not aware of the extent of
her injuries. 86 What sets the statute of limitations running is
knowledge of the fact that she was injured, and in some jurisdictions, knowledge of their causal connection with the defendant's
conduct. 87
The question of when a victim of therapeutic sexual exploitation became aware of her injuries and their cause is a complex one. Most patients are already in emotional or psychological distress when they seek therapy. They may not immediately
perceive that their emotional health is deteriorating. Even if
they are aware that they are feeling worse, they may not link the
deterioration to the therapist, especially during the pendency of
the sexual relationship. Because of the psychological mecha83. See, 61 AM. JuR. 2D. Physicians, Surgeons & Other Healers §319 (1981); 51 AM.
JUR. 2D. Limitation of Actions §135-136 (1970); Salten, supra note 80 at 207.
84. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D. Physicians, Surgeons & Other Healers §321 (1981); Salten,
supra note 80 at 213-219.
85. See Salten, supra note 80 at 213, n. 143.
86. See, 61 AM,JUR.2D. Physicians, Surgeons & Other Healers, §321, n. 78, 81 (1988
Supp.).

87. See Salten, supra note 80 at 213, n. 142; and note 93, infra.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss3/1

24

Morin: Civil Remedies

1990]

CIVIL REMEDIES

425

nisms of repression and denial, a victim may be intellectually
aware of her injuries without being psychologically able to understand their implications or to act on that knowledge. Despite
these difficulties, most courts which have analyzed the statute of
limitations issue in sexual exploitation cases have attempted to
fit it into the discovery rule framework. 88
A ground breaking Pennsylvania case, in which a jury
awarded the plaintiff $665,000 for her therapist's negligence in
improperly administering drugs and engaging in a sexual relationship with her, illustrates. 89 The plaintiff, Gale Greenberg,
had sought treatment from the defendant, Donald McCabe, in
June 1986 when she was suffering from a neurotic condition diagnosed as the "harried housewife syndrome".9o Dr. McCabe
told her at the initial visit that she had a lot of sexual hang-ups,
and initiated an ongoing sexual relationship with· her within six
months of the beginning of therapy.91 As a part of the therapy,
he also administered drugs to the plaintiff which she claimed
caused permanent psychosis and organic brain damage. 92
The therapeutic relationship lasted from June 1968 through
February 1974, and suit was filed on January 5, 1976. There was
no dispute that Pennsylvania's two year statute of limitations
applied; however, the defendant argued it had begun to run long
before the termination of the therapeutic relationship. The district court, ruling on a motion for directed verdict, concluded
that there was a legitimate issue of fact for the jury as to
whether the plaintiff had filed her claim within the statute of
limitations. 93
88. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F. 2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986); Decker v.
Fink, 47 Md. App. 202, 422 A. 2d 389 (1980); Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765
(E.D. Pa. 1978), affirmed 594 F. 2d 854 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 840; Seymour v. Lofgreen, 209 Kan. 72, 495 P.2d 969 (1972).
89. Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affirmed 594 F.2d 854
(3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 840.
90. [d. at 770.
91. [d.
92. [d.
93. [d. at 770. In making its decision, the court clarified the standard to be applied
to discovery rule cases under Pennsylvania law. First, it rejected defendant's argument
that knowledge of the injury. alone is sufficient to start the statute running, ruling that
the limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows or reasonably
should know the cause of the injury. [d. at 767. Second, although mental disability does
not toll the statute of limitations under Pennsylvania law, the court ruled that the plain-
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The court's analysis began by acknowledging that the plaintiff knew she was suffering from mental illness of some sort prior
to the relevant cut-off date, but held that was not dispositive of
the issue, since she had some mild neurosis when she first went
to the defendant. 94 The dispositive issue was "whether plaintiff
as a matter of law knew or should have known ... of deterioration in her mental condition that was caused by the defendant's
conduct, in light of all the circumstances (including the mental
state she was in as a result of Dr. McCabe's conduct}."911 Even
under this generous interpretation of the discovery rule, the
court had to engage in some elaborate analysis to uphold the
jury's verdict.
At trial, the plaintiff testified that Dr. McCabe told her in
1968 that it was "wrong" for them to have a sexual relationship,

a fact which defendant claimed put her on constructive notice of
his improper treatment. The court rejected that argument, reasoning that the jury might have concluded the defendant's statement reflected a moral judgment rather than his opinion that it
was improper psychiatric care. Further, this statement was contradicted by the defendant's statements that the relationship
would aid Mrs. McCabe in her therapy. Thus it was reasonable
for the plaintiff not to infer the treatment was damaging to
her.96 Even if she was aware that the treatment was medically
improper, the jury could have found that she had no reason to
know of the causal connection between the malpractice and her
condition, since she was already very ill when she started
tiff's mental condition "is among the many factors which can be weighed by the factfinder in determining the time of discovery, insofar as that condition was caused by the
defendant." [d. at 768.
The court emphasized the "narrowness" of its ruling on this issue, pointing out in
dicta that "[ilt does not mean that a plaintiff may offer slow-wittedness, idiosyncratic
weaknesses of reasoning or lack of legal sophistication to excuse a failure to discover.
Thus we do not mean to suggest that a defendant can be deprived of the important
protections provided by the statute of limitations [citations omitted], because he or she
has the misfortune to harm a plaintiff who is not mentally capable of bringing the action
within the statutory period. Rather, we mean to say that the statutory period does not
begin to run if the fact-finder concludes that the plaintiff's failure of discovery, objectively determined, is brought about by the very nature of the defendant's conduct." [d.
at 769. The court also suggested alternative conceptual approaches, such as "estoppel",
which might be used to justify its decision. [d. at 769.
94. [d. at 770.
95. [d.
96. [d. at 770.
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treatment. 97
Plaintiff was also advised by two psychiatrists at a drug detoxification program, to which she was admitted in 1972, that
her sexual relationship with Dr. McCabe was wrong. 99 The defendant argued that the severity of her injuries when she was
hospitalized and the advice from two outside psychiatrists
should have started the statute of limitations running at least as
early as 1972. 99 Again, the court found that a jury was not compelled to conclude she had reason to discover the causal connection in the absence of evidence that either of these doctors advised her that the defendant's therapy was psychiatrically
improper or had damaged her.loo
The court considered three factors to be of special significance in its analysis. First, the plaintiff's impaired mental condition and extreme dependence, which resulted from the defendant's mishandling of the transference phenomenon, supported a
jury inference "that she neither knew nor by objective standards
could have known under those circumstances that the defendant's treatment of her was related to her psychological damages
before 1974."101 Second, the defendant's reassurances that the
sexual relationship and the drugs he was administering were
proper therapy were relevant in determining what a reasonable
plaintiff would have done. l02 Finally, the continuing therapistpatient relationship during the time period when the defendant
claimed the plaintiff should have known his improper treatment
was causing her harm "could be taken into consideration in determining what investigation of the defendant's conduct the reasonably diligent plaintiff would have made and what knowledge
the reasonably diligent plaintiff would have had. "103
In Simmons v. United States,I°4 a federal court of appeals
relied upon the reasoning of Greenberg to uphold the district
court's finding that the plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue
97.Id.
98. Id. at 770-771.
99. Id. at 771.
100. Id. at 771.
101. Id. at 771-772.
102. Id. at 772.
103. Id.
104. Simmons v. United States, 805 F. 2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986).
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until she was advised by her subsequent treating psychiatrist
that the defendant's improper handling of the transference phenomenon had caused the emotional and psychological damage
she suffered. lOG Plaintiff's experts had testified that she was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the unethical conduct of the defendant, and she had no idea her emotional
condition had been caused by that conduct until advised by her
subsequent psychiatrist. Until then, she had believed that what
had occurred had happened because she was "a very bad person,
a worthless person, a guilty person", all of which caused her
great guilt and shame. loe The court pointed out that transference, dependence, and the psychiatrist's assurance that the conduct is good for them, makes it very difficult for patients to believe the therapist caused their emotional damage; instead they
blame themselves. l07 A delay in filing a legal claim may not be
"unreasonable" under these circumstances.
Although one might applaud the analyses and the results of
the Greenberg and Simmons cases, the discovery rule has serious limiations in evaluating whether a victim's claim against her
therapist for sexual exploitation is timely filed. First, in jurisdictions with more restrictive interpretations of the rule (i.e. where
only knowledge of the injury and not causation is required),
plaintiffs may be unfairly barred from pursuing their claims. lOS
Secondly, both courts and juries may reach different conclusions
where all of the "significant" legal factors in McCabe are not
present. Finally, even a generous interpretation of the discovery
rule may not adequately protect the interests of patients who
105. [d. at 1366, 1367 ("Ms. Simmons did not know Mr. Kammers' conduct caused
her emotional injury until another 'doctor so informed her in February 1983. It was not
knowledge of his legal fault that she gained in 1983, but knowledge of the fact that his
mishandling of her normal transference had caused her psychological damage.") [d. at
1367.
106. [d.
107. [d. at 1368.
108. See, e.g., Seymour v. Lofgreen, 209 Kan. 72, 495 P. 2d 969 (1972). Under the
Kansas discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the "fact of injury
becomes readily ascertainable." [d., 209 Kan. at 77, 495 P.2d at 973. Plaintiff tried to
avoid the harsh effects of this rule by claiming that her mental illness made her unable
to ascertain the fact of her injury, but the court ruled that she was barred from making
that argument because she did not assert "legal incapacity" as a cause for her delay. [d.
Moreover, if she had alleged a legal disability, her action would have been barred by the
one year tolling statute applicable to actions brought upon removal of a disability. [d.,
209 Kan. at 78, 495 P.2d at 974.
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are advised by another professional that their sexual relationship is inappropriate and harmful, but who are unable to appreciate or act on that advice because of their dependency and continuing relationship with the offending therapist.
By way of illustration, consider the case of Marcia Decker,
who claimed her therapist, Gerald Fink, improperly manipulated
the analysis to engage in sexual relations with her during each
and every visit to his office from 1971 until the end of the summer of 1975. 109 Ms. Decker filed suit against Dr. Fink in March,
1977, well within the applicable three-year statute of limitations
if the period did not begin to run until the termination of their
relationship. Under Maryland law, however, the "continuous
treatment" rule is subsumed by the discovery rule; i.e., if the
patient learns or reasonably should have learned of her injury
during the course of treatment, the statute of limitations begins
to run from the time of actual or constructive knowledge. llo
The trial judge, ruling on a motion for directed verdict at
the close of plaintiff's evidence, found that Ms. Decker should
have known of the alleged malpractice in May of 1973, when she
consulted another psychiatrist who told her the sexual relationship was inappropriate and not beneficial treatment, and she
should terminate the relationship.lll The consulting therapist
had testified Ms. Decker was capable of understanding his advice; however, she testified she was in a state of confusion and
anxiety caused by her emotional and psychological dependence
on Dr. Fink during this period of time. ll2
109. Decker v. Fink, 47 Md. App. 202, 422 A. 2d 389 (1980). There was testimony
that the regular treatment was terminated at the end of 1971, but the sexual relationship
continued during plaintiff's regular visits to the same office where therapy had taken
place. The court did not make any distinction between the formal therapy and the continuing sexual relationship in its analysis. Id., 47 Md.App. at 205, 422 A.2d at 391.
110. Id., 47 Md.App. at 393, 422 A.2d at 210.
111. Id., 47 Md.App. at 394, 422 A.2d at 212. A subsequent Maryland case has called
into question the standard of review applied by the court in deciding the Fink case.
O'Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 295-297, 503 A. 2d 1313, 1320-1321 (1986). In upholding
the trial judge's grant of a directed verdict to the defendant, the Court of Special Appeals had applied a clearly erroneous standard to the fact-finding made by the trial judge
rather than by resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the plaintiff. Id. The
substantive legal standards applied in the Fink case, however, were not challenged by
the subsequent decision and are still valid Marlyand law.
112. Decker v. Fink, 47 Md. App. 202, 205, 422 A.2d 389, 391 (1980).
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In the Fink opinion, there was no analysis of the pressure
exerted by the plaintiff's continuing relationship with her therapist, and its possible effects on her ability to psychologically understand or act upon the consulting therapist's advice. The
court's interpretation of the discovery rule rendered Dr. Fink's
continuing misconduct, which might be viewed as a reason' to
estop him from asserting a statute of limitations defense during
the time the sexual relationship continued, legally irrelevant.
In Greenberg, the court pointed out that the statute of limitations was particularly inappropriate for a determination as a
matter of law in sexual exploitation cases, "where the central
factual inquiries concern the reasonableness of plaintiff's ignorance and of her diligence under all the circumstances, and
where the injury and cause thereof are subtler and more complicated than in the normal malpractice case."IlS This author sub113. Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affirmed 594 F.2d
854 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 840. The factors which led to a favorable result
in the Greenberg case were not based upon pure "discovery rule" considerations. The
court's analysis incorporated three distinct exceptions to the general statute of limitations rule: incapacity or diminished capacity, the continuous treatment rule, and estoppel based on fraudulent concealment. As a comparison of the Greenberg and Fink cases
will illustrate, these exceptions are not applied uniformly by courts in different jurisdictions, and cannot be depended upon to protect victims of psychiatric sexual exploitation.
In the Fink case, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that her "impaired judgment" (caused by her emotional and psychological dependence on the defendant) should
toll the statute. 47 Md.App. at 209,422 A.2d at 392. One of the psychiatrists who treated
plaintiff in 1973 testified that "she was not psychotic, not hallucinating, but could make
decisions". [d., 47 Md.App. at 208-209, 422 A.2d at 393. Based upon that testimony, the
court found that the evidence did not support a claim of "impaired judgment". By contrast, in Greenberg, the court considered the plaintiff's impaired mental condition and
extreme dependence upon the defendant to be an important factor in its discovery rule
decision. 453 F. Supp. at 772.
Likewise, in Greenberg, despite the fact that Pennsylvania does not have a "continuous treatment rule" tolling the statute of limitations until the end of treatment by the
defendant, the court considered the ongoing therapeutic relationship to be an important
factor in determining the reasonableness of the plaintiff's state of knowledge. 453 F.
Supp. at 772. By contrast, in Fink, the court held that once the plaintiff had been advised of the impropriety of the defendant's conduct, there was no legal excuse for her
failure to file an action against him, notwithstanding their continued relationship. 47
Md.App. at 212, 422 A.2d at 393-395.
Finally, in Greenberg, the court considered the therapist's reassurances that the sexual relationship and the drugs he was administering were proper therapy to be significant in determining the reasonableness of plaintiff's efforts to discover her injury. 453 F.
Supp. at 772. By contrast, in Fink the court summarily dismissed the possibility that its
statutory exception where a party is kept in ignorance of a cause of action by the fraud
of an adverse party might be applicable. 47 Md.App. at 209, 422 A.2d at 393.
A therapist's reassurances could arguably form the basis for a claim of "fraudulent
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mits that the same factors make it extremely difficult to evaluate these cases in terms of traditional "discovery rule" analysis.
Victims of psychiatric sexual exploitation would be better protected by a statute of limitations which incorporates the relevant
clinical considerations (such as dependency, transference and
the power imbalance inherent in the therapeutic relationship)
unique to this particular class of plaintiffs.
B.

A

PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REMEDY

The states which have created statutory rights of action for
psychiatric sexual exploitation have not adequately addressed
the statute of limitations problem. 1l4 The most liberal approach
is in Minnesota, where the usual two year statute for medical
malpractice cases was enlarged to five years "after the cause of
action arises" for sexual exploitation cases.ll6 This five year rule
may be expected to protect a number of potential plaintiffs, but
it incorporates all the limitations of the discovery rule discussed
in Section IliA, supra, and therefore does not provide adequate
protection. Instead, a standard should be set which incorporates
the relevant legal and clinical factors and offers all victims a rea~
sonable opportunity to pursue their claims.
At a minimum, this writer recommends that the statute of
limitations should not begin to run until after the patient's relationship with the therapist has ended. Given the power imbalance, patients should not be expected to psychologically appreciate or act upon the therapist's inappropriate conduct during the
concealment" which, in some jurisdictions, tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff learns or should have learned of facts sufficient to give knowledge of the concealment. See, e.g., 61 AM. JUR. 2D, Physicians, Surgeons & Other Healers, §322 (1981);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, §12 (West 1959); Flotech, Inc. v. Dupont, 814 F.2d 775
(1st Cir. 1987). Obviously, victims of psychiatric sexual abuse have knowledge of the
underlying facts (e.g. that the sexual conduct has occurred), but often do not have
knowledge that this conduct was harmful to them until many years later. Arguably, they
do not have knowledge of their therapists' "concealment" of the wrong until such time as
they are able to understand the causal connection between the therapist's breach of duty
and their injuries. Moreover, there is no question that during the course of the therapeutic relationship, a therapist has a fiduciary duty to disclose that a sexual relationship
may be harmful to his patients. Many experts in this field agree that this fiduciary duty
continues indefinitely even after the formal therapeutic relationship has ended. See
supra note 71 and accompanying text.
114. See note 48, supra.
115. MINN. STAT. ANN. §148A.06 (West 1989).
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ongoing relationship, even if they are advised of its dangers.
Once the relationship has ended, plaintiffs should be given a
reasonable number of years within which to bring their claims.
During this period, the statute should be stayed until the patient has received an "informed diagnosis," i.e., has been advised
by a subsequent therapist of the impropriety and the harm
which it caused. If the subsequent therapist (or expert testimony) establishes the patient was psychologically incapable of
understanding or acting upon the informed diagnosis, the statute should be stayed until the patient reaches the necessary
level of understanding.
Opponents may argue that this rule would subject therapists to perpetual liability for their sexual offenses. Indeed, in
cases where the psychological damage is severe, the patient may
be hospitalized, resist further treatment, or be unable to understand the therapist's role in causing her injuries for a substantial
period of time. In setting policies and standards for the limitation of actions, legislatures have to balance potential
defendants' needs for finality with potential plaintiffs' legitimate
interests in seeking redress for their grievances. When the potential defendant has created the very conditions which cause
the plaintiff to delay in filing her claim, the balance should
weigh in favor of the plaintiff. In this writer's view, the proposed
standard would place the responsibility for the victim's delay
where it belongs - on the offending therapist who misled her,
betrayed her trust, and rendered her unable to understand the
implications of his actions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Therapist-patient sexual exploitation is a significant social
problem. The consequences to victims, who are primarily
women, are devastating. Civil litigation is the only avenue of redress which can provide monetary damages to compensate victims for their injuries, and to pay the expenses of future treatment. Successful civil actions are difficult, despite the fact that
most courts which have viewed the problem consider therapist's
sexual relationships with patients to be malpractice. There is
often a statute of limitations problem, because the nature of the
therapeutic relationship makes it difficult for patients to recog-
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nize that their therapists have injured them. If the case is permitted to progress, it is common for the therapist to deny that
there was a sexual relationship, or, alternatively, to claim that it
was a mutual relationship between two consenting adults.
In either case, plaintiffs face problems of proof. Since there
are seldom any witnesses, it is difficult to prove that the conduct
occurred. Likewise, unless force was used, it is hard for the
plaintiff to deny that she consented to the sex. Plaintiffs often
feel re-victimized by the litigation process, which usually involves probing questions about their sexual and psychological
histories. Civil "rape-shield" laws, like the one enacted in Minnesota, can help to protect plaintiffs from inappropriate questioning about their private sex lives.
The courts sometimes have difficulty in applying traditional
common law theories to sexual exploitation cases. Since the conduct does have intentional aspects, some courts consider "consent" to be a possible defense, even if the case is characterized
as a simple negligence or malpractice claim. This article contends that the consent defense is inappropriate unless the plaintiff proceeds on an intentional tort theory. Further, for clinical
reasons, it is virtually impossible for a plaintiff to give truly "informed consent" to her therapist's sexual advances.
The underlying issue of real concern in these cases is the
extent of a therapist's duty to a patient outside of the confines
of the therapy setting, or to a former patient whose therapy has
been terminated. For the most part, clinicians and courts are in
agreement that a therapist has a duty to refrain from sexual relations with a present patient, even if the sex takes place outside
of the therapeutic setting. Former patients pose more of a dilemma. Some clinicians believe that sex with a former patient
may be appropriate after a period of time, especially if it is to
pursue a serious relationship. Others believe that a therapist's
duty to refrain from sex with a former patient can never be
abrogated.
Until the clinicians reach some consensus on this issue, a
therapist's duty to his former patient will have to be determined
on a case by case basis by the trier of fact. If a plaintiff presents
evidence that dependency, transference or the power imbalance
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was still operating when the sex took place, this author recommends that the burden should shift to the therapist to establish
that he did not know (or have reason to know) that his sexual
conduct exploited the patient's trust.
Courts also have trouble with the statute of limitations issue
in sexual exploitation cases. Most courts try to fit the facts into
the typical discovery rule analysis, which requires only that the
plaintiff be on notice of the fact that she was injured and, in
some jurisdiction, their causal relationship to the defendant's
conduct. This standard does not adequately take into account
the psychological mechanisms of transference, dependency and
the power imbalance between therapist and patient. Because of
these psychological factors, a potential plaintiff may be unable
to understand the harmfulness of an ongoing relationship with
her therapist, even in the face of explicit advice from another
professional. This article recommends legislation which would
stay the statute of limitations until after the potential plaintiff's
relationship with her therapist has ended, and she has received
an informed diagnosis from a subsequent therapist. Since the
therapist's misuse of the therapeutic process is responsible for
the plaintiff's delay in filing, he should be estopped from using
that delay as a defense to liability.
As two of the pioneer clinicians and researchers in this field
have pointed out, filing a complaint
can be an important, positive, and healing experience for patients who have been sexually involved
with their therapists. It can be a constructive assertion of one's rights, helping to counteract feelings of passive victimization .... It can be means
by which a consumer holds accountable the professional for his or her violation of professional
standards .... It can be an act of courage and
self-affirmation, a refusal to be intimidated into
paralysis by the explicit and implicit threats of
the exploitive therapists. lJO

Legislative reform is the most effective means to ensure that our
legal system takes into account the special clinical and legal con-'
siderations presented by these cases.
116. Pope & Bouhoutsos, supra note 2 at 110.
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